Rigorous owner-investor analysis: audited filings, earnings power value, and economic moats
Apple Inc.
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Latest share price
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Diluted EPS
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Return on equity
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Return on assets
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Net margin
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P/E valuation (10-yr low / avg)
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Macro dashboard
The macro picture at a glance
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Yield curve
US Treasury curve, then and now
Current — · 3mo — · 6mo — · 1yr — · 3yr — · 5yr —
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Curve profile & macro regime. Not enough live readings to classify the curve shape. The 10Y sits at —, the 10Y–2Y spread at — and the 10Y–3M spread at —. Over the past year the bill sector moved — while the long end moved — — a mixed pattern. Comparing the 10Y to the Fed Funds target rate reveals structural normalization: while the central bank anchors the short end, long-end market rates operate on real supply-and-demand dynamics, fiscal deficits, and debt issuance rather than monetary policy alone.
Three months — the policy anchor. The 3M bill at — is the cleanest market proxy for where the Fed funds target sits today; it holds close to the prevailing policy range until the market gains confidence in the next decision. This short-end rate represents the ultimate risk-free hurdle rate—the baseline yield against which every corporate investment and equity purchase must be measured.
Six months — the forward policy read. The 6M at — prices the expected average policy rate over the next two quarters, while the 1Y at — extends that horizon to four. Comparing those points with the 3M reveals whether investors expect a pivot, a pause, or renewed tightening. Not enough front-end readings to judge near-term policy expectations.
Ten years — the risk-free anchor & S&P 500 implications. The 10Y at — is the baseline discount rate for equities, corporate bonds, and mortgages, pricing the expected average Fed funds rate over the next decade plus an inflation-risk premium. Interest rates act on asset prices like gravity acts on matter: when the 10Y rises to ~—, it exerts heavy financial gravity on broad market equities. Guaranteed ~— risk-free Treasury returns severely compress the ERP (Earnings Yield minus 10Y Yield), destroying the traditional "Margin of Safety" unless market P/E multiples compress or corporate earnings surge. A flat 10Y–2Y spread leaves little extra compensation for taking duration or credit risk, so equity investors must rely on earnings growth rather than multiple expansion to generate returns. A mixed 10Y ensures that even if short-term Fed rates drop, S&P 500 mid-cap and high-leverage constituents face rising long-term refinancing costs, eroding profit margins for companies with heavy debt loads.
Thirty years — the term premium & Nasdaq / tech implications. Not enough long-end readings to judge term premium or duration risk. With the long end offering little extra compensation over the 10Y, growth-stock valuations depend more on the absolute level of rates than on term premium. High long-term discount rates still compress Net Present Value for distant cash flows, but cash-rich mega-cap tech giants can use their balance-sheet strength to offset some of that headwind while capital-intensive growth names remain exposed. Nasdaq 100 and long-duration growth equities are therefore the most rate-sensitive segment of the market.
One year ago versus today. The structural story is un-inversion rather than a parallel rally. Short maturities (1M–6M) have eased as policy normalised — the 3M moved from — to — — while the long end has shifted the other way, with the 10Y at — versus — and the 30Y at — versus —. That combination is bear steepening: expanding fiscal deficits and heavy coupon issuance, plus a rebuilt term premium for holding duration, keep long rates elevated even as cash rates fall.
Three years ago. The purple curve captures the peak of the hiking cycle: front-end yields repriced violently as policy turned restrictive, pushing the 3M to — against a 10Y of — and producing a deep inversion — historically the market's clearest recession signal.
Five years ago. The grey curve is the post-pandemic baseline: policy rates pinned near zero under ZIRP with active large-scale asset purchases suppressing term premium, so the whole front end printed near — and even the 30Y only reached —.
Equity risk premium. The ERP is the index earnings yield minus the 10Y risk-free rate. With the 10Y near —, an index trading at 22x earnings yields roughly 4.5%, leaving an ERP of about — — thin versus the multi-decade norm of 3–4 points. Investors are paid little for accepting equity risk over a Treasury that now clears a similar yield, so the hurdle rate for broad market exposure rises and multiple expansion has to be earned by growth rather than by discount rates.
Balance sheet refinancing. Cheap fixed-rate debt raised in the ZIRP window is maturing into a curve where the belly (— at 5Y) sets corporate coupons. Mid-cap and high-leverage constituents refinance at several hundred basis points above their legacy stack, and that interest drag lands directly in earnings — a headwind concentrated in the leveraged half of the index rather than the cash-generative leaders.
DCF multiple compression. Long-duration growth equities carry most of their value in distant cash flows, so they are the most sensitive part of the market to the long end. A 10Y at — raises the discount rate applied to those out-year flows, and because discounting compounds, net present value falls disproportionately for companies whose free cash flow arrives five to ten years out. Mathematically that is multiple compression, independent of any change in the operating forecast.
Mega-cap cash bifurcation. Higher rates are not uniformly negative inside the index. Cash-rich titans earn a real return on large Treasury and money-market balances, partially offsetting the valuation headwind and funding capital spending internally. Capital-intensive, high-leverage growth names dependent on external financing face the opposite: rising coupons, tighter credit conditions and shareholder pressure to fund growth from operating cash flow.
Sources
Yield curve — FRED daily Treasury series DGS1MO, DGS3MO, DGS6MO, DGS1, DGS2, DGS3, DGS5, DGS7, DGS10, DGS20 and DGS30. Historical snapshots use the nearest prior business day when the target date is a weekend or holiday.
Macro deck
The macro picture as slides
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